The environment we are in may encounter interference from jammers at any time

AOPA said that as the military gradually upgraded GPS interference during training exercises, pilots were eager to equip their equipment with GPS navigation technology by the deadline. Increasing flight safety risks.

Pilots who flew into airspace during a four-day military exercise affected by GPS interference in early February described the impact on AOPA, from unclear notice to unexpected flight paths. Although many GPS interference events are planned for multiple regions soon, AOPA is still dissatisfied with FAA’s efforts to adopt the solution.

“We received information from pilots who have questions about safety and questions about the response of their navigation system,” said Rune Duke, senior director of AOPA Airspace, Air Traffic and Safety. “AOPA has raised concerns with the FAA, but we don’t think they are paying enough attention to the issue.”

Paradoxical driving situations are evolving: More and more aircraft owners are performing a mission to equip themselves with GPS-based Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS-B) surveillance technology to avoid being caught after January 1, 2020 Excluded from highly controlled airspace, such as defence. Movement that obstructs GPS is increasing.

In late February and early March, FAA’s flight advisory informed pilots in Washington of the planned “gps jammer Test”; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Missile White Sands, New Mexico; and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Flight Advisory said that each multi-day event “may lead to unreliable or unavailable GPS signals.”

The Washington State GPS interference event between February 26 and March 1 underscored the huge impact of GPS interference. Using the complex airspace of a densely populated area, the job is to reach 67 airports (approximately 1,500 aircraft) and countless aircraft arriving at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport.

AOPA noted that the number of GPS interference events tripled between 2012 and 2017, putting pressure on FAA and DoD leaders, “but we think action is needed,” Duke said.

A series of recommendations issued in 2018 by a working group co-chaired by AOPA of the RTCA Technical Advisory Organization constituted the starting point for the action plan.

One of the 25 recommendations states that “the online surveillance resources available to pilots online are fragmented and obscure,” and reports from pilots who shared their experience during recent GPS interference in the Southeast region provided new examples of pilot information gaps. interference

“Some pilots know this by automatically disseminating information to airport terminals, while others are informed that interference may occur when authorized to use the RNAV method. Because interference may affect navigation and air traffic control surveillance, some aircraft It has also been sent to non-radar airspace.