The Drive/WarZone published an article describing an anti-drone system known as the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS). The system consists of a RADA RPS-42 short range, S-band, hemispheric, AESA radar mounted on an MRZR dune buggy. On top of the radar unit is a gyro-stabilized CM202 multi-sensor optical ball that provides positive visual identification of targets. (2) The systems apparently operate in pairs. When a target is designated, the targeting data can be fed to various systems such as a Modi GPS jammer which is a backpack signal jammer. (3) Theoretically, the targeting data could be fed to a ship’s hard-kill defensive systems but it is unknown (and probably unlikely) that this was possible, in this case. It appears that the Modi jammer was used to disrupt the ground control signal to the Iranian drone thereby causing it to crash.
In recent years the threat of drones has become increasingly vivid to many security agencies. Drones, nowadays, are used by terrorist and criminals for a multitude and variety of activities such as dropping small bombs on enemy forces in Syria and Iraq, and the same drones are often used for reconnaissance and smuggling of illicit contrabands to prisons.
MADIS uses cell phone jammer to block a drone’s communications which forces it to crash. There are also some versions of the MADIS which are capable of actually firing at drones. The report doesn’t clarify which version of the MADIS was used in this instance.
For a local department to justify a drone jammer, I would think that they would need to prove that there is a legitimate threat from drones to the community. Now, many small departments own MRAPs or similar vehicles so I could be very wrong.
The Army has no standard-issue offensive jamming gear at all, although some is being developed and ad hoc kit is being hastily fielded to Europe. The Air Force has the EC-130H Compass Call, but it’s a big and slow target derived from the C-130 turboprop cargo plane, and the aircraft is wearing out.