Jammers can also achieve counterfeiting

According to a study by the Advanced Defense Research Center, the Russians are hijacking the global navigation system on a large scale to chaotically displace thousands of ships and aircraft in their places of residence. Law enforcement, transportation, airlines, power plants, your phone, and everything that relies on GPS time synchronization and location are vulnerable to GNSS hackers.

A report commissioned by the British Space Agency stated that all critical infrastructure in the UK relies on GNSS and GPS. The holiday home of Russian President Vladimir Putin is protected by the GNSS deception network, which established a no-fly zone on his huge Italian mansion C4ADS.

C4ADS stated that the cost of GNSS gps jammer equipment is about $ 300. On May 15, 2018, under a clear sky, Russian President Vladimir Putin drove a bright orange truck in a fleet of construction vehicles for Kerch from Russia to Crimea The opening of the Strait Bridge. It is 11 kilometers long and is the longest bridge in Europe or Russia.

When Putin drove across the bridge, something strange happened. The satellite navigation system installed in the control room of more than 24 ships parked nearby suddenly began to display false information about its location. Their GPS system told the captain that their parking place at Anapa Airport was more than 65 kilometers.

According to the Advanced Defense Research Center (a security think tank of C4ADS), this is no accident. He said that this is a planned plan, the purpose is to make it difficult for anyone nearby to follow or browse Putin’s figure.

“All critical national infrastructure depends on GNSS to a certain extent”-the Russians began to invade it. The Russians began to invade the GNSS system on a large scale to enable thousands of ships and according to C4ADS to study the fake GNSS signal, the location of the aircraft.

GNSS consists of international satellites orbiting the earth. The United States ’global positioning system, China ’s Beidou plan, Russia ’s Glonass plan, and Europe ’s Galileo plan are all part of GNSS.

Your phone, law enforcement, transportation company, airline, and power plant-everything depends on time synchronization and GPS location-are vulnerable to GNSS hackers. According to a report released by the British Space Agency in 2017, “All critical national infrastructure relies on GNSS to a certain extent, of which communications, emergency services, finance and transportation are identified as particularly intensive users.” The report said that when the system is down, the attack that paralyzed the British GNSS will cost about £ 1 billion a day.

The Russian government said in the newspaper every week that the Russian government “scrambling, blocking or tampering with GNSS signals in a more blind and long-lasting manner, which has a wider range and wider area than the previous public report suggested.” Daily Shadows on Cyber ​​Security Digital Shadows. service. Until the last two years, C4ADS believed that the Russians mainly used GNSS interference or forgery to cover up Putin’s location.

For example, a large area above the Idokopas corner near Gelendzhik on the Black Sea coast of Russia appears to be part of the GNSS permanent predatory area. C4ADS said that Cape is considered to be Putin ’s country house, which contains a large luxury private residence-“a large Italian palace, several helicopter support frames, an amphitheater and a small port.” It is the only Russian owned and Private residence with the same level of airspace protection and GNSS interference in the Kremlin.

“The geographical location of the counterfeit incident is closely related to the places where Vladimir Putin traveled abroad and visited the country, which shows that the Russian army has developed GNSS mobile jamming devices to protect the Russian president,” said the digital shadow. “These incidents are also consistent with the location of Russian military and government resources. Although in some areas, the motive is likely to restrict access or hinder the entry of foreign armed forces.”

Vessels sailing near Gelendzhik reported that their satellite systems received false navigation data. “In June 2017, the captain of the merchant ship Atria provided direct evidence of GNSS deception activities near the coast of Gelendzhik, Russia, when the ship ’s on-board navigation system indicated that it stated at C4ADS that about 20 kilometers from the center of Galendzhik Airport, More than two dozen ships reported similar riots in the area that day.