Last year’s Suez Canal terrorist attacks and planned exercises underscored the continuing threat to the maritime sector posed by continued deliberate attacks of any kind. The attacks of September 11, 2001, the previous year’s USS Kerr and the next year’s tanker Limburg, marked the beginning of a new era in which the world, especially the global shipping industry, was concerned. In recent years, we have been reminded that our various types of ports, docks, rigs and ships are not only vulnerable to deliberate attacks, but also vulnerable to natural events, accidents and accidents, and other unintentional actions.
Less than a decade ago, the term “maritime safety” represented a new concept, especially for the commercial sector. Since then, the maritime community has launched counter-terrorism and piracy awareness campaigns, trained seafarers, and trained new personnel responsible for the safety of ships, facilities and companies. Nowadays, with the continuous improvement of technological progress, another focus must be paid attention again-this time it is Maritime Cyber Security (MCS). The Maritime Preamble to Cyber Security stems from the network characteristics specific to the marine sector, especially data transmission via radio frequency (RF) rather than fixed lines (optical or copper) or directional microwaves.
It can be said that, similar to other industries, the evolving technology and interconnectivity of the maritime sector has become a double-edged sword. We are increasingly using these systems and equipment, and if they are lost or damaged, we will be even more vulnerable. Overcoming vulnerabilities affecting navigation, engines and engine controls, freight operations and communications is a challenge. Efforts must be made to protect all risks of any type of event that may be adversely affected. Relevant personnel should use the ongoing SCS preparation process. For a four-step plan, the first step should be awareness.
According to industry reviews, various white papers and academic reports, the marine sector’s awareness of cybersecurity is relatively low. Needless to say, the maritime industry strives to keep pace with routine operations every day, so little is known about network vulnerabilities. But today, this situation has begun to change, as both the government and the private sector have focused on some issues. For example, in April, the House of Representatives passed a bill to preserve the positioning, navigation, and timing system (PNT) infrastructure that could complement GPS with powerful ground signals. The Cooperative Shipowner Program (SOCP) has released a new computer-based training tool (CBT) to raise awareness of MCS, which is funded by the United States Maritime Administration. ISST (Businessman Sailor Information System Security Awareness) CBT covers a wide range of topics, from work computers to network security and strong cryptography practices. Some transportation companies have recently upgraded their cyber threat matrices and refined their procedures. The University of Texas, led by assistant professor Todd Humphreys, has proven the potential of identity theft, which is well known. ISST (Businessman Sailor Information System Security Awareness) CBT covers a wide range of topics, from work computers to network security and strong cryptography practices. Some transportation companies have recently upgraded their cyber threat matrices and refined their procedures. The University of Texas, led by assistant professor Todd Humphreys, has proven the potential of identity theft, which is well known. ISST (Businessman Sailor Information System Security Awareness) CBT covers a wide range of topics, from work computers to network security and strong cryptography practices. Some transportation companies have recently upgraded their cyber threat matrices and refined their procedures. The University of Texas, led by assistant professor Todd Humphreys, has proven the potential of identity theft, which is well known.
The second step is identification and assessment. Ship and facility investigations should be conducted on a case-by-case basis to fully determine the known network vulnerabilities of each network system. The U.S. Coast Guard announced that its latest issue, 2014-2015, will be dedicated to cyber security, and also released COMDTNOTE 5510, entitled “Cyber Security and Marine Transport System (MTS).” The Coast Guard said in a statement to all in March that the person in charge of the port (COTP) should encourage ships and facility operators to take stock of their network systems, identify people who could cause traffic safety accidents, and assess how those systems could be protected Degree of attack, abuse or malfunction. ”
Vulnerabilities exist at all levels and in all areas. Criminals have learned to destroy RF tracking systems for cars, containers and other cargo. Rigs and drilling vessels exchange large amounts of RF data with onshore partners for operations. State and non-state actors, including hacker groups, have vowed to attack all forms of energy production worldwide. Radio frequency interference worldwide has increased. In recent years, North Korea has proved the effectiveness of long-range interference through its relentless attacks on South Korea. Iran and Iraq are also intervention experts in many countries. gps jammer are attracting global attention and increasing the risk of severe interference events in the marine sector.
Vessel positioning and navigation operations depend on satellite navigation systems (GNSS), such as GPS. Whether due to natural events (sun), unintentional or intentional behavior, interference with weak GPS RF signals can damage electronic mapping systems (ECDIS / ECS), automatic identification systems (AIS), and GPS receivers to avoid collisions . GPS compass, unless it does not affect the immediate availability of auxiliary positioning sources. For example, on April 1, the entire system of the Russian GNSS GLONASS suffered unprecedented comprehensive damage, and the system’s placement for nearly 11 hours was worthless.
A comprehensive network assessment of the navigation bridge may indicate that loss of GPS signals, interference or identity theft may affect some or all other navigation units, including gyrocompasses, guidance systems, radar / ARPA, sounders, VHF ASN radios, etc. Mitigation Manufacturers can specifically require manufacturers to issue signal strength alerts on new GPS receivers to use inertial navigation systems, RF interference detectors and other positioning systems such as the improved Loran (eLoran). The eLoran positioning system has been fully validated, is very resistant to jams, is accurate to functions such as GPS, and can fill GNSS gaps in urban canyons and other areas, in dense structures and tunnels underground and underwater. Powerful ground systems such as eLoran are not affected by extreme weather conditions such as satellite systems.
Threat identification facilitates the third step: training employees while improving systems, equipment, and processes to increase industry resilience. As MCS vulnerabilities are carefully identified and shared across the industry and law enforcement, awareness of the threat of consolidation among many stakeholders will mature. Therefore, risk assessments should be improved to influence the development of potential and solutions.
The third step may include the compilation of the MCS intervention plan, the execution of exercises (including unannounced exercises), and the implementation of the new system, making it possible to complete tasks or provide redundancy, such as eLoran to complete tasks. GPS and other GNT PNT systems (eg GLONASS, Galileo and Compass).
Finally, the fourth step is to verify that the SCS preparation process is working properly and is continuously improving. This next step is essential for optimal preparation. The industry must remain vigilant and ready to face known and unknown maritime cyber threats.