The Chinese seem to have joined the Russian military to develop and use technology to deceive (hijack) GPS signals. Since 2018, the use of this technology has been well known in Shanghai. The implementation of GPS spoofing in China is different from the Russian method. Identity theft in Russia will cause all GPS devices in the area to appear in the same location instead of the many different locations they are actually in. In contrast, when China’s identity theft is active, it will show that individual ships are located in different locations, but they always surround the same central point, which is obviously the place where the spoofing signal is broadcast. What does this produce? We call it the “Cropfield Circle” model. The crew slowly entering the Shanghai port noticed this. To this end, they monitored the location of other ships through their AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponders. According to international law, all large sea vessels must carry and use AIS equipment, which will continuously broadcast the ship’s GPS location. However, in some cases, the ship suddenly saw that the AIS position of nearby ships changed. With regular use/or no use of binoculars, the crew can see the actual positions of other ships. At the same time, the AIS display can also display them in other places in the circular area. A few minutes later, the AIS signal accurately reported the position again. In this case, it should be noted that there is no GPS receiver on board, and there is no land GPS device in the circle to receive signals.
The Chinese government denied any responsibility for this GPS fraud and blamed it on the smugglers, who apparently used counterfeit equipment to avoid being caught by the police while smuggling ships carrying illegal goods. In one case, the smuggler was still caught due to an accident caused by identity theft, and it was found that the smuggler was carrying illegally obtained sand nearby and was taken out of the port to sell to other places. . The mining of sand in this area is forbidden because this precious commodity is in high demand elsewhere, and the export of more commodities damages the environment.
The person who used this new type of gps blocker near Shanghai has not been captured, partly because the device was apparently only used 6 times and then used for a short period of time. From the evidence collected so far, if the jammer is kept long enough, the range and center of the crop circle can be found, and then the police will be dispatched to the location to seize the equipment and the equipment in it. ‘use.
This is not the first time criminals have obtained and used electronic signal jamming equipment. Gangster equipment is commonly used in certain types of radar communication systems. GPS interference is a new thing, especially in an unprecedented way. But now, maritime smugglers are using more electronic jamming devices to evade detection and avoid being caught once they are detected. The police determined that the deceptive signal appeared to be somewhere in a building owned by a local petrochemical company. Searching the premises and asking the people working there did not find anything. Here again,
GPS deception/jamming systems require qualified personnel to design and build. The Chinese have developed and built advanced equipment, but so far, the police do not know who it might be. It is suspected that the equipment may be North Korea because North Korea has developed more sophisticated methods to travel to and from North Korea and smuggle sanctioned goods from North Korea. If they create such a device, of course they will not issue a press release about it, but will sell it in cash or cryptocurrency at an appropriate price.
Users of GPA jamming devices often remain silent on this. In recent years, more and more evidence has shown that Russia often interferes with or deceives GPS signals, mainly to hide the exact location of key figures or military units. Such equipment development can easily fall into the scope of Russia’s capabilities. In early 2019, a civilian think tank (C4ADS) released a report describing how it found nearly 10,000 cases in which someone from Russia apparently interfered with or deceived satellite navigation signals. Not only the US GPS, but also signals from non-US satellite navigation systems (China Beidou, EU Galileo, Japan QZAA and even Russian GLONASS). Most of this activity is not direct interference, but usurpation. Obviously, this is done to hide the true location of the main Russian officials (such as President Putin) and the Russian military. Identity theft is particularly common among Russian troops in Ukraine and Syria. Identity theft replaces real satellite signals with fake signals, making smart bombs or planned attacks on targets inaccurate. The identity of the Russian army in Ukraine and Syria is particularly common. Identity theft replaces real satellite signals with fake signals, making smart bombs or planned attacks on targets inaccurate. The identity of the Russian army in Ukraine and Syria is particularly common. Identity theft replaces real satellite signals with fake signals, making smart bombs or planned attacks on targets inaccurate.
Identity theft no longer requires expensive or high-tech equipment, so it becomes more and more popular and convenient. Although the US military weapons and navigation systems have a stable backup in the form of INS (Internal Navigation System) systems, these systems are useless if identity theft cannot be detected. US systems should be able to detect identity theft and revert to INS, but the Americans did not disclose the details of how these systems work, making it difficult to modify the deceptive system to be smaller. Detectable. This is one of the reasons why the United States has not released information about identity theft. To further complicate the problem, the AIS device reported that it did not receive any GPS signals. In the event of a breakdown, large ships usually carry two AIS devices. However, when using the Shanghai jammer, AIS sometimes did not receive any signal, which caused the alarm to sound.
Other countries complain about not that secret, and the culprit is usually Russia. At the end of 2018, Finland and Norway made public allegations, accusing Russia of deliberately jamming GPS signals in Finland and northern Norway from locations near Russian military bases on the Cola Peninsula at sea. By Barents. Since NATO’s end of the Cold War in 1991, NATO has held its largest training exercises, causing such interference. Although Russia is known to GPS and other signals. Norway stated that it had positioned the jammer at a specific location, but when Russia refused to admit any interference, Norway refused
What is curious about this incident is that it has no effect on NATO’s military exercises, and even commercial airliners operating in the area are not working properly with GPS signals. Potential victims are planes or civilians on the ground on a small scale, and they rely on commercial navigation equipment using GPS. Again, this may be the point, because Russian companies have long produced a variety of GPS jammers. These jammers are usually ineffective for military GPS users, but useful for criminals, terrorists or anyone among them. An irregular war (Russia has been Ukraine since 2014). When it comes to the destruction of diplomatic relations with Norway and Finland, these two countries do not need to remember what Russia is and has always been a bad neighbor. C4ADS concluded that identity theft in Russia may be a common practice whenever President Putin is on a business trip. This may be a security measure that can be assassinated using drones loaded with explosives. . This has become a common tactic of Islamic terrorists, who regard Putin as the main target of drone attacks. C4ADS concluded that identity theft in Russia may be a common practice whenever President Putin is on a business trip. This may be a security measure that can be assassinated using drones loaded with explosives. . This has become a common tactic of Islamic terrorists, who believe that Putin is the main target of drone attacks. C4ADS concluded that identity theft in Russia may be a common practice whenever President Putin is on a business trip. This may be a security measure that can be assassinated using drones loaded with explosives. . This has become a common tactic of Islamic terrorists, who believe that Putin is the main target of drone attacks.
NATO countries have long been aware of Russian electronic warfare activities, especially the increasing number of Russian interference and deception systems. Some of them have been exhibited in Syria and Ukraine, and Russia regards complaints of interruptions caused by interference or counterfeiting as free publicity for this device. Russian GPS jammers have some military uses, but they also attract non-military customers. For example, Russia started selling a new portable GPS jamming system called Pole 21 in 2016. The system is special because a single Pole 21 unit can be installed on an existing cell phone tower (or separately on a portable tower). ). Each Pole 21 device can output 20 watts of power and block GPS signals (and similar GLONASS, Galileo and Beidou systems) for up to 80 kilometers. The pole 21 is also designed to act as a backup GSM transmitter for issuing commands to nearby pole 21 units. In this way, the Russians claim to be able to quickly protect large areas from GPS-guided missiles and bombs and the shutdown of the vehicle’s GPS system. The Russians admitted that the 21st pole would also destroy all commercial GPS equipment in the blocked area. The biggest problem with Pole 21 is that since the mid-1990s, Russia has developed and sold many different GPS jamming systems, which proved ineffective in combat.
Russians’ interest in GPS jamming was made public in the early 1990s, when a private Russian company AviaConversia was established with the purpose of developing cheap, light and reliable GPS jammers. In 1997, the company provided its commercial and military customers with four different types of GPS jammers (each priced at about $4,000). The devices only produce 4 to 8 watts, which makes them difficult to detect and bombard. These jammers are believed to be able to effectively block GPS signals from 150-200 kilometers away, depending on the terrain. These jammers can run on batteries without batteries and weigh between 8 kg (18 lbs) and 12 kg (26 lbs). During operation, the jammer consumes less than 25 watts of power.
In the mid-1990s, blueprints for building their own GPS jammers popped up on the Internet using ready-made parts that cost less than one hundred dollars. Need welding skills. Soon, a similar assembly unit sold for only $40 on the Internet. At the same time, American GPS experts pointed out that these jammers do not have enough power to plug most military GPS receivers into GPS, but they may interfere with many commercial products, especially consumer products. The US Air Force later revealed that this was the case. In 2003, Iraq’s failed attempt was proof of this.
By 2002, AviaConversia had disappeared and appeared to be absorbed by further classified Russian military interference. By the 1990s, AviaConversia had established many relationships with the Russian Armed Forces and implicitly guaranteed that its interference sources were working. After 2001, experiments conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense found that cheap jammers are not so effective, while larger jammers built with standard components and cost close to $10,000 are largely ineffective for such systems. Military-grade GPS navigation system. At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense has built and tested GPS jamming detectors and a guidance system that is sensitive enough to guide missiles to active jammers.